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Ma rch 2 , 1970

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
the direct election bernu~c I believe Umf
fully one-half of the Members of the
Senate s.re opposed to t h e direct syslem
but they would be unable to agree on
any substitute plan.
For that reason, it seems likely to the
junior Senator from Ala bama that there
will be no reform at this point. Does t he
Senator feel that t hat is a likelihooa ·>
Mr. CURTIS. I do. There are 34 of
the 50 States that would be adverselv
affected if we changed to the dir ec.t
election of the President. I do not believe they have any such mandate f1 om
the people back home to lessen the
power of their sovereign States in choosing the President.
Mr. ALLEN. The Senator's argumen1.
is that the voter in Nebraska wants to go
to the polls feeling he is going to be a
part of the Nebraska vote, and when the
Nebraska vote is counted it will count
for something because it will be represented in the electoral vote of the State
of
braska. It will not be commingled
wit 75 million other votes, and will be
·de tified with that single State.
. CURTIS. When I cast my vote in
·aska, it will not be bUlied under a
bstone in Chicago.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
The PRESII)H'(G OFFICER (Mr. HART
in the cha~Under the previous order,
the ~en_9oklr from Montana is recognized
for 1)-ffiinutes.

_/ /
LAOS

•

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
take the ft.oor of the Senate at this time
because of the serious situation in Laos.
I do so not to criticize, but, if possible,
to be constructive, to be helpful, and to
wave a warning flag about this area
which might perhaps be helpful in preventing our becoming involved too deeply and in too costly a manner. When I
speak of costly, I do not mean money
alone, but total cost, including manpower.
Perhaps, the Pathet Lao and their
North Vietnamese allles may btop the
offensive on the Plain of Jars, short of
the cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang; that would be in the pattern of
previous operations. Then again, they
may push forward against these two
capitals and press to the border of Thailand. Only time will indicate what plans
and objectives may be involved . In any
event, the question of the " nonwar" or
the "secret-war" or "interlude war" in
Laos cannot be avoided any longer.
Notwithstanding the Geneva accord of
1962, the North Vietna mese are deeply
involved in this military situation. So,
too, is the United States. Press r eports
indicate that the Thais may also be engaged. The involvement is so transparent
on both sides as to make less than useless
the effort to main tain the fiction of the
accord or even to exchange charge and
countercharge of violations. We are both
in it-North Vietnamese and Amelicans--and we are in it up to our necks.
What disturbs me is that it is not only
that both naLions are forbidden by the
G€'neva ag-reement to use forces in Laos
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'I he mili tarv opf'rnt.lons about which

we know so much. and yet so little,
seem to depend heavily on 11111 people
from the Lao-Vietnamese border highlands. With these tribesmen, who are not
Lao but Meo, there has been a close
U.S. m111tary or paramilitary, connection
which predates the Geneva Accord of
1962. According to the press, the connection is still there.
In any event, neither the Meo nor the
Lao regular armies have been able to hold
back the combined North VietnamesePathet Lao pressure. The result Is that
a further "Americanization" of the war
In Laos has taken place which now seems
to be matching the effort to "Vietnamize"
the situation in South Vietnam. It has
been estimated that American bombers
make 500 or more sorties dally over Laos
and that the United States is spending
something on the order of $200 to $300
million for aid to Laos.
It needs to be recalled at this time,
therefore, that the full-scale U.S. Involvement In Vietnam evolved from much
smaller beginnings. First, It was a little
more aid and a fe1v more military advisers, then It was the supply of transportation, then air support, and then
GI's.
I am sure that the President does not
want that sequence to be repeated. The
Defense Department has been at pains to
gainsay it. In that respect, this President's intentions are not unlike those of
his predecessor at the beginning of the
Vietnamese Involvement; the protestations of this Secretary of Defense also
have a not unfamiliar ring. Nevertheless,
a parallel can develop in Laos. Will we
hear next what became the fateful rationale of the war in Vietnam? Will we
hear next that a larger war is not up to
us but up to them? Will we submerge in
that rationale. once again, our responsibility to decide where and when in consideration of national interests we shall
risk the lives of Americans? Will we
affirm that fundamental responsiblllty
or leave it to others who have no reason
to use it for this Nation's well-being?
To be sure, there :s no question that
the North Vietnamese have Ignored the
Geneva accord of 1962 to which they are
signatory. Does that compel us to take
It upon ourselves to do the same? There
are other signatories of the accord. Have
the others immersed themselves in the
war? Has the Soviet Union? The United
Kingdom? France? Indeed, has China?
How can a deepening involvement in
Laos accord with the vital interestsand I use the word advisedly--of this
Nation? Does it accord with the new Nixon doctrine-which I fully support-which propounds a reduction of our military Involvement on the Southeast Asia
mainland? Does It tlt with the need for
resources to meet the Inner needs of this
Nation?

The North Vietnamese have long since
moved troops into the border areas of
Northeastern Laos to guard the so-called
Ho Chi Minh trails. These are the route'>
oy mean& of which men and supplles
move down intn South Vietnam. E~ tile
~ tok..-n. Ame:i<a::. ;::a.nes ha.-e long
-~tnce ~ ocmbing ~.::e trails. The bilateral violations or the Geneva. accord in
this case a.t least have been directly related to the war in Vietnam.
Of late, however, both Americans and
North Vietnamese have expanded military activities further into Laos, in the
region of the Plain of Jars. There is re;.Jorted to be something on the order of
45,000 to 50,000 North Vietnamese now
on the northern border of Laos. According to reports, not only has manpower increased but antiaircraft missiles
have been implanted. On the part of the
United States the bombing in Laos is
reported to be heavier tha.'l 1t was in
North Vietnam and that there could now
be as many as 20,000 sorties a month.
In short, the war seems to be pouring
out of South Vietnam through the Laotian panhandle into the rest of Laoo and
the rest of Indochina. Even Cambodia,
which has sought wisely, behind the wall
of neutrality, to hold back the jungle of
war has felt, of late, the intensified pressure of this flow of destruction.
As in 1965, the events In Laos caution that the threat of a continuing inconclusive involvement In Southeast
Asia remains unchanged. Indeed, It may
be enlarging to embrace Laos. If the milItary seesaw goes down In Vietnam only
to rise In Laos, our situation will not
have improved; It will have wor~ened. In
my judgment, only the utmost v!gllence,
on the part of the responsible officials of
this Government, of the President, and
the Senate In particular, and of the press
will counteract this Inevitable tendency.
Prince Souvanna Phouma has said that
he was going to ask cochairmen of the
Geneva accord, the United Kingdom and
the Soviet Union, to call a meeting of all
the signatories to put into effect the
agreement of 1962. This renewed call Is
to be commended, and certainly it should
be supported in every possible way. It
would be my hope that all signatories to
the Geneva accord would meet in an
effort to restore a measure of stability to
the situation in Laos. Moreover, the
scope of any such meeting mught be enlarged to include th esituation in all of
Southeast Asia, with the partlcipa.t!on
of other affected nations, such as Cambodia and Thailand.
If the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union, a.s cochairmen, would call this
conference, it might be possible to draw
stlll useful guidance from the Geneva
agreements of 1954 which involved the
three Indochinese States. As for Laos, the
agreement of 1962 seems to me, still, to
be valid. In retrospect, this agreement
was never given a full opportunity to get
off the ground. Negotiations In Paris or
in Geneva but, In any event, at an authoritative level, seem to me stlll to offer
the best prospect for a settlement which
would enable the United States to withdraw completely from the present military enmeshment on the Southeast Asia
mainland.
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When thnt hns <' <'lllt' 1\bnut . it 1\,,uld l><•
my hope thnt.. 1\.' 0ne ,,r U1t' ~ignnt,,rws
outside of Sout ht'Rst Asia. we wnukt ,., Ill
wtth the othf'rs in bnnA
guarant~e!'
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manner--an OPIX'rt ttnity "tu.-h cr ..·,
have not known for centurks.
The time is short; the time is n1)W to
face up to the Implications of this worsening situation In Laos. The danger of
our over-extended commitment in Southeast Asia needs to be considered frankly
and without delay. The fact Is that the
President and the Congress have &till n ot
corralled an open~ended mi11tary involve~
ment in a part of the world which is nnt
directly vital to our security, In a part of
the world In which the involvement was
a misfortune to begin with and every day
of Its continuance a tragedy .
Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President. will thr
distinguished majority leader yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, indeed.

